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Abstract
This paper uses a series of experiments with commercial bank loan oﬃcers to test
the eﬀect of performance incentives on risk-assessment and lending decisions. We
ﬁrst show that, while high-powered incentives lead to greater screening eﬀort and
more proﬁtable lending, their power is muted by both deferred compensation and
the limited liability typically enjoyed by credit oﬃcers. Second, we present direct
evidence that incentive contracts distort judgment and beliefs, even among trained
professionals with many years of experience. Loans evaluated under more permissive
incentive schemes are rated signiﬁcantly less risky than the same loans evaluated
under pay-for-performance.
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Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.“An evaluation of compensation practices at banking organizations preceding the ﬁnancial crisis reveals
that they did, in fact, contribute to safety and soundness problems. Some ﬁrms gave loan oﬃcers
incentives to write a lot of loans, without suﬃcient regard for the risks associated with those activities.
The revenues that served as the basis for calculating bonuses were generated immediately, while the
risks might not have been realized for months or years [...]. When these or similarly misaligned incentive
compensation arrangements were common in a ﬁrm, the very foundation of sound risk management
could be undermined by the actions of employees seeking to maximize their own pay.”
—Daniel Tarullo, Board of Governors of the United States Federal Reserve1
1 Introduction
Following the global ﬁnancial crisis, bank compensation has come under increased scrutiny.
While much of this attention has focused on incentives for top management, there is growing
recognition that non-equity incentives (such as commissions) provided to loan originators and
risk managers, may share some of the blame. Indeed, providing appropriate performance
incentives to employees at the lower tiers of a commercial bank’s corporate hierarchy is a
diﬃcult problem: their very responsibility is to collect information that the bank cannot
otherwise observe, making monitoring diﬃcult; they enjoy limited liability, and may have
diﬀerent risk and time preferences than the bank’s shareholders.
This paper presents direct evidence on the eﬀect of incentives on lending decisions and
risk-assessment. In a series of experiments, loan oﬃcers were paid to review and assess actual
loan applications, making over 14,000 lending decisions under exogenously assigned incentive
contracts. We evaluate three important classes of incentive schemes: (i) volume incentives
that reward origination, (ii) low-powered incentives that reward origination conditional on
performance, and (iii) high-powered incentives that reward performance and penalize default.
Our ﬁrst set of results document the eﬃcacy and limitations of performance incentives
in lending. We provide evidence that the structure of performance incentives strongly af-
1In a speech entitled “Incentive Compensation, Risk Management, and Safety and Soundness” at the
University of Maryland Robert H. Smith School of Business. Washington, D.C., November 2, 2009.
1fects screening eﬀort, risk-assessment, and the proﬁtability of originated loans. Loan oﬃcers
who are incentivized based on lending volume rather than the quality of their loan port-
folio originate more loans of lower average quality. By contrast, high-powered incentives
that reward loan performance and penalize bad lending decisions cause loan oﬃcers to ex-
ert greater screening eﬀort, reduce exposure to loans with higher perceived ex-ante credit
risk, and induce signiﬁcantly more proﬁtable lending decisions while leading only to a small
reduction in lending volume. Relative to a baseline treatment with low-powered incentives,
high-powered incentives increase the probability that a bad loan is detected and increase
proﬁts per originated loan by up to 3.5% of the median loan size; in contrast, origination
incentives lead to a substantial decline in the quality of originated loans and reduce proﬁts
per loan by up to 5% of the median loan size.
Building on these results, we explore a number of constraints, inherent to any incentive
contract in lending, that may limit the eﬃcacy of pay for performance. Consistent with the
predictions of a simple model of loan oﬃcer decision-making, we ﬁnd that deferred compen-
sation attenuates the eﬀectiveness of high-powered incentives. When incentive payments are
awarded with a three month delay, our measures of costly screening eﬀort decline by between
5% and 14%, and we document a corresponding but less pronounced decline in the quality of
originated loans. Notably, we ﬁnd that deferred compensation also moderates the negative
eﬀect of incentive schemes that emphasize loan origination over the quality of originated
loans. Relaxing loan oﬃcers’ limited liability constraint (similar in spirit to giving a loan
oﬃcer equity in the loan) induces greater screening eﬀort and leads to more conservative
lending decisions, but has only a moderate eﬀect on the proﬁtability of originated loans.
In our second set of results, we demonstrate that performance incentives also have impor-
tant eﬀects on the subjective perception of credit risk. We ﬁnd that loan oﬃcers evaluating
applications under performance contracts that provide strong incentives for approval system-
atically inﬂate internal ratings they assign to the loans they process. While internal ratings
2are strongly predictive of default under all incentive schemes, loan oﬃcers facing volume
incentives inﬂate risk ratings by as much as .3 standard deviations and irrespective of the
underlying asset quality. Loan oﬃcers inﬂate all features of the credit evaluation, including
measures that are diﬃcult to quantify, such as the character of the borrower, as well as
metrics based on harder information such as interest coverage ratios. Since incentives aﬀect
both risk ratings and approvals, the loan book approved under a permissive incentive scheme
may therefore be of poorer quality but, based on internal ratings alone, may in fact look less
risky than a set of comparable loans approved under a more conservative incentive scheme.
The use of actual loan applications, evaluated by experienced loan oﬃcers, allows us to
identify the impact of performance incentives on risk-assessment and actual risk-taking. By
design, our experimental set-up focuses on the lending decision, and allows us to isolate
the impact of performance pay on the quality of the initial screening decision from other
channels through which incentives may aﬀect loan performance, such as the collection of soft
information or the degree of ex-post monitoring.2
This paper contributes to several literatures. The importance of incentives within the
ﬁrm has long been appreciated (see Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988) for a review),3 yet
most empirical work that credibly identiﬁes exogenous variation in performance incentives
has focused on relatively simple production tasks (see Lazear (2000); Bandiera, Barankay and
Rasul (2007, 2009, 2011); Kremer, Kaur and Mullainathan (2010)). We extend this literature
2While client acquisition and monitoring are clearly important, the focus of our experiment is on the
impact of performance pay on screening incentives (for related evidence on screening incentives in sub-prime
and small-enterprise lending, see Keys, Mukherjee, Seru and Vig (2010) and Agarwal and Ben-David (2012)).
The experimental approach we pursue in this paper allows us to isolate the impact of performance pay on
screening behavior from other factors inﬂuencing loan origination and performance, such as information
production (Stein, 2002) and ex-post monitoring (Petersen and Rajan, 1994a). This distinction is also
motivated by the fact that in the lending environment we study, the three stages of the lending process
(collection of infomation and assembling information in the loan ﬁle, making a lending decision based on
this information and monitoring originated loans) are carried out by diﬀerent employees, each facing their
own wage schedule.
3For evidence on team incentives, see Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) and Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul
(2011), for more on rank order based incentives see Lazear and Rosen (1981).
3by focusing on a complex task in which unobservable eﬀort is of paramount importance, and
where performance pay may aﬀect productivity through a direct incentive eﬀect as well as a
variety of behavioral channels, such as its impact on the subjective perception of credit risk.
Second, and relatedly, we contribute to the literature on incentive compensation and
risk-taking. The existing evidence in this area has focused almost exclusively on risk-taking
among CEOs and top executives (see, for example, Bebchuk and Spamann (2010), Bolton,
Mehran and Shapiro (2010), Edmans and Liu (2011) and Fahlenbach and Stulz (2012)).4
Balachandran, Kogut and Harnal (2011), for instance, show that during the recent ﬁnancial
crisis, the prevalence of equity-based executive compensation at banks was associated with
a higher probability of the bank’s default. Mechanisms similar in their eﬀect to equity
compensation have been proposed to align the incentives of employees at lower levels of a
bank’s hierarchy with those of the bank.
A growing literature highlights the importance of incentives for the production and trans-
mission of information for risk-management in commercial lending. Hertzberg, Liberti and
Paravisini (2010) demonstrate the presence of moral hazard in information revelation in an
Argentinian bank. Liberti and Mian (2009) show that hierarchical separation between loan
oﬃcers and their supervisors leads to greater reliance on hard information. Qian, Strahan
and Yang (2011) study the incentive eﬀects of a policy reform in China that increased the
accountability of loan oﬃcers at state banks. They show that this non-pecuniary change in
loan oﬃcer incentives led to a signiﬁcant improvement in the assessment of credit risk. Using
data from a large European bank, Berg, Puri and Rocholl (2012) show that in a setting where
loan approvals are based entirely on hard information, incentives that reward lending volume
lead loan oﬃcers to strategically manipulate applicant information for borrowers close to the
bank’s minimum threshold for approval. Finally, and most directly related to our study,
4For more on performance pay among CEOs and top executives, see Jensen and Murphy (1990), Murphy
(1998) and Margiotta and Miller (2002). For a review and discussion of bank incentives in the context of
sub-prime lending, see also Bebchuk and Spamann (2010), Bebchuk et al. (2010) and Rajan (2010).
4Agarwal and Wang (2009) and Agarwal and Ben-David (2012) exploit an exogenous change
in the compensation structure of a bank in the United States to show that volume incentives
encourage excessive risk-taking and increase defaults.
The ﬁndings we report in this paper make the following three main contributions. First,
existing evidence on the eﬀect of performance incentives in lending is limited to incentive
systems with relatively apparent ﬂaws (such as an origination bonus). By contrast, our
experimental design allows us to test a range of incentive arrangements, including those
which are closer to an optimal contract. We oﬀer the ﬁrst empirical measurement and
quantiﬁcation of two important constraints that prevent ﬁrst-best contracting in a lending
setting: deferred compensation and limited liability. Additionally, our experimental design
tracks aspects of loan oﬃcer behavior that would normally be unobservable to a bank or
econometrician, and allows for the direct measurement of the relationship between incentives,
eﬀort, and loan performance.
Second, we present new evidence that performance incentives can distort the assessment
of credit risk, even when internal ratings are not tied to loan oﬃcer compensation. The ﬁnd-
ing that loan oﬃcers change their assessment of credit risk in response to monetary incentives
is consistent with the psychological concept of cognitive dissonance (Akerlof and Dickens,
1982) and resonates with stylized evidence from sub-prime lending (Barberis, 2012): loan
oﬃcers manipulate their beliefs about loans they review because they are not comfortable
thinking that the loans they wish to approve under prevailing incentives are indeed of poor
quality. This “wishful thinking” eﬀect is also similar to the one identiﬁed by Moore, Tanlu
and Bazerman (2003) and Mayraz (2012) in laboratory experiments in which participants
assigned to the role of the buyer in a ﬁctitious market reported lower private valuations and
predictions of future asset prices than those assigned to the role of the seller.
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on lending in informationally opaque
credit markets. We examine the role of loan oﬃcer eﬀort and risk-assessment in an envi-
5ronment of high idiosyncratic risk. This is related to, but distinct from, the special role
played by loan oﬃcers in collecting soft information, and monitoring borrowers following the
disbursal of a loan (see Petersen and Rajan (1994b), Berger and Udell (1995), and Berger,
Klapper and Udell (2001))5. The separation of information collection and approval decisions
is common for a wide range of ﬁnancial products, and is especially relevant in emerging
markets for two reasons. First, the small ticket size of consumer and small-enterprise loans
in these markets typically rules out the use of a costly, relationship-intensive lending model
so that the collection of customer information for small-ticket loans is often outsourced to
third parties. Second, regulation often constrains the degree of decentralization of foreign
lenders (see Mian (2006)). This further limits the use of relationship lending, especially for
smaller loans, and places greater importance on risk-management at the time of the initial
screening decision, which is the focus of our analysis in this paper.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next two Sections we discuss the
basic incentive problem, and describe the incentive schemes we test and how they relate to a
simple theoretical model of loan oﬃcer decision makig. Section 3 describes our experimental
set-up, and section 4 presents our main results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Performance Incentives in Lending
The potential for excessive and socially ineﬃcient risk-taking in response to poorly designed
incentive schemes has long been recognized. However, ﬁrst-best incentive contracts may not
be implementable in many real world settings. Pay for performance schemes require easily
quantiﬁable criteria against which to measure and reward performance, which may be diﬃcult
or impossible to deﬁne for complex tasks, such as loan origination. In many organizational
settings, the implementation of optimal incentive contracts is further constrained by multi-
5For more empirical evidence on lending relationships see also Harhoﬀ and Korting (1998) and Santikian
(2011). For a survey of the literature on relationship lending see Boot (2000).
6tasking concerns, the diﬃculty in observing eﬀort, and the tradeoﬀ between the desire to
balance incentives and insurance against negative outcomes.6
The basic incentive problem in lending arises from the fact that loan oﬃcers are tasked
with allocating the bank’s capital based on private information and risk-assessments that
are usually unobservable to the bank (Udell (1989), Berger and Udell (2002), Stein (2002)).
In this setting, several important constraints preclude the implementation of a contract that
would align the incentives of the bank’s shareholders with those of its employees by making
a loan oﬃcer the fully liable residual claimant of the loan.
First, loan oﬃcer eﬀort is typically unobservable to the bank. Second, loan oﬃcers
are by necessity protected by limited liability, since they take decisions on large amounts
of money, which typically far exceed the amount of any penalty a bank could enforce to
penalize bad lending decisions. Third, loan oﬃcers may have a diﬀerent time horizon and a
higher discount rate than the bank. It may therefore be more expensive to generate eﬀort
with deferred pay, and pay that is conditioned on loan outcomes, than with an immediate
performance bonus. Finally, in contrast to production tasks with a clear relationship between
input and outcome, the assessment of credit involves a complex tradeoﬀ between risk and
return in an environment with high aggregate and idiosyncratic risk. This makes it diﬃcult
to reliably identify idiosyncratic defaults and further complicates the use of (noisy) realized
outcomes as a benchmark for the measurement of loan oﬃcer eﬀort and performance.
While these constraints are present in any lending environment, they are likely to bind
much more severely in emerging credit markets, characterized by severe information asym-
metries, limited credit information and poor enforceability of debt contracts. Banks in this
environment are thus particularly reliant on the risk-assessment of their front-line employees,
which in turn introduces signiﬁcant scope for moral hazard and agency conﬂict within the
lending institution (see, for example, Liberti (2005), Liberti and Mian (2009)).
6See Gibbons (1998) for a review.
7Where banks provide performance incentives, loan oﬃcer compensation usually consists of
a ﬁxed base salary and a performance component. This performance component may place
weight on lending volume, ex-post loan performance, or a combination of the two.7 The
recent debate on bank compensation has focused on two key features of such incentive
contracts in lending: First, the incentive power of the contract, which aﬀects how sensitive
loan oﬃcers are to the costs of default; and the often short time-horizon of compensation,
which may lead loan oﬃcers to focus on short-term gains rather than long-term value. In
the experiments reported in this paper we vary both dimensions, and demonstrate that both
have important implications for risk-assessment and lending decisions in a sample of highly-
experienced loan oﬃcers.8 In addition, we provide novel evidence on behavioral eﬀects that
may limit the eﬃcacy of loan oﬃcer incentives as a tool for managing credit risk.
As a framework for the empirical analysis, we develop in the appendix a simple model
of performance incentives and loan oﬃcer decision-making. In the model, a loan oﬃcer may
exert costly eﬀort to obtain a signal about the quality of a proposed loan. The model makes
four simple predictions about the eﬀect of performance incentives on loan oﬃcer behavior.
First, an origination bonus scheme as often employed by commercial banks, which incen-
tivized lending volume without penalizing default leads to indiscriminate lending, low eﬀort
and high defaults. By contrast, high-powered incentives that reward proﬁtable decisions and
penalize default result in greater screening eﬀort but more conservative lending decisions.
Second, deferring compensation reduces the power of performance-based incentives. Third,
relaxing a loan oﬃcer’s limited liability constraint increases eﬀort. Finally, intrinsically mo-
tivated loan oﬃcers exert more eﬀort.
7In many cases, the contract also includes a team performance component. To limit multi-tasking con-
cerns, our experiments focus on changes to the individual performance component of the contract.
8Heider and Inderst (2011) develop a model relating the choice of loan oﬃcer incentives to the severity of
the bank’s internal agency problem which is in turn determined by the banks’ competitive position. In our
experiments, we abstract from the bank’s optimal choice of incentive scheme and focus on the loan oﬃcer’s
(behavioral) response to a menu of commonly implemented incentive contracts.
8In the empirical section of this paper, we take these predictions to the data and additionally
study the eﬀect of performance incentives on loan oﬃcers perception of credit risk. We
ﬁnd that volume incentives lead loan oﬃcers to inﬂate internal ratings, even when these
ratings are not tied to the loan oﬃcer’s evaluation or incentive scheme, while high-powered
incentive contracts lead to a more accurate assessment of credit risk and more proﬁtable
lending decisions.
3 Experimental Incentive Schemes
We test the predictions of the model (see appendix) using a framed ﬁeld experiment, in
which commercial bank loan oﬃcers evaluate loan applications from the client database of a
large Indian bank. To test the impact of performance contracts on loan oﬃcer behavior, we
exogenously vary the incentive power, the time horizon over which performance incentives
are paid, and the degree of limited liability enjoyed by a loan oﬃcer. We vary the power of
the incentive contract by assigning loan oﬃcers to contracts that specify three conditional
payments: a payment wP made when a loan is approved and performs, a payment wD, made
when a loan is approved and defaults and a payment w that is made when a loan is declined.
Because the outcome of a loan is only observed with some delay, performance incentives,
in practice, must be paid with a lag. In our setting, under the non-deferred payment scheme,
incentives were paid immediately following an experimental session. In the deferred compen-
sation scheme, incentive payments were delayed three months, with the loan oﬃcers given a
choice of returning to collect the payment, or receiving a check in the mail. This allows for
two contrasts: from the policy perspective, comparing deferred-compensation, performance
based pay to immediate compensation based on origination.
Finally, we experimentally relax loan oﬃcers’ limited liability constraint, by providing an
initial endowment that the participant can lose if he approves a number of non-performing
9loans. This mimics proposed “clawback” schemes. Throughout the paper, we express ex-
perimental incentive contracts as as the vector w = [wP,wD,w]. In addition to these three
performance-based conditional payments, loan oﬃcers received an unconditional show-up fee
of Rs 100 (US$ 2.25), each time they participated in a session of the experiment. To ensure
that participants perceived conditional payoﬀs as salient, we calibrated the mean payout of
experimental incentive schemes to roughly 1.5 times the hourly wage of the median partic-
ipant in our experiment, a Level II public sector credit oﬃcer with an annual income of Rs
240,000 (US$ 4,800) and an approximate hourly wage of Rs 125 (US$ 2.5).
Because understanding the impact of monetary incentives on (costly) screening eﬀort
was a main objective of the experiment, half of our sessions included a “costly information”
feature. In this condition, loan oﬃcers were given an initial information endowment of Rs
108. In the “costly information” setting, loan oﬃcers were able to review only basic client
and loan information items for free (two out of nine sections of the loan application) and
were charged Rs 3 per section for as many of the remaining loan ﬁle sections as they chose
to view. In these sessions, loan oﬃcers received their remaining information endowment in
cash at the conclusion of the session, in addition to their incentive payments.
Table I summarizes the experimental incentive schemes. An obvious feature of incentive
schemes C is that a (weakly) dominant strategy from the participants perspective is to
exert no eﬀort screening, and accept every loan application. This corresponds to a volume
“origination piece rate” often observed in consumer lending. In addition to these schemes,
the research staﬀ ran two additional schemes which do not mimic real-world schemes. Scheme
D paid Rs 50 if a loan performed, and zero if it defaulted or was rejected. Scheme E paid
Rs 100 (US$ 2.25) if a loan performed, and 0 if it defaulted or rejected. As these schemes
do not have real-world counterparts, and were run on a reduced sample, we do not focus on
them in this paper. However, complete results are reported in the supplementary appendix.
We test the following predictions. First, incentives awarded for origination will lead
10to excessive risk-taking. Indeed, purely rational and proﬁt-maximizing loan oﬃcers should
indiscriminately approve all applications under scheme C, and exert no screening eﬀort.
Second, high-powered incentives will increase eﬀort by increasing the rewards for a proﬁtable
lending decision and increasing the penalty for originating a loan that ultimately becomes
delinquent. Thus, the amount of eﬀort exerted under various treatment can be ranked B
> A > C. Third, high-powered incentives will induce more conservative lending behavior
by increasing the cost to the loan oﬃcer of making a bad lending decision. Fourth, if a
loan oﬃcer’s discount rate is greater than zero, the amount of eﬀort induced by deferred
compensation will be less than the amount of eﬀort induced by A and B. Finally, if credit
oﬃcers are intrinsically motivated, or believe that their performance on this task may aﬀect
their reputation, they may invest in screening loan applications even when such scrutiny will
not yield additional remuneration.
4 Experimental Context and Design
4.1 Experimental Task
The experiment is designed to closely match the lending process for low-documentation small
business loans, a class of loans for which the accurate assessment of credit risk depends
crucially on the judgment of the bank’s loan oﬃcers. Loan oﬃcers recruited from leading
Indian commercial banks visit our labs outside of work hours to evaluate credit applications.
The credit application ﬁles were obtained from a leading commercial lender in India, and are
described below. Participants evaluate these applications, complete a risk evaluation form,
and make a recommendation about whether the loan should be approved.
While the lending decisions are hypothetical, in the sense that loans underlying the
experiment have been previously made and their outcome is observed, participants receive
11only information that was available to the bank at the original time of application. Because
we observe the performance of loans in our data set, we can pay participants performance
incentives based on their decision and the actual outcome of the loan. Our sample of loans
consists of unsecured small-business working capital loans with a ticket size of less than Rs
500,000 (US$ 10,000). Sales and origination channels for this class of loans are generally
distinct, so that (analogous to low-documentation loans in the United States) loans are
sourced by a bank’s sales agents who collect client information, which is then forwarded to a
credit oﬃcer for approval. The task faced by the bank’s credit oﬃcers is to screen and make
proﬁtable lending decisions based on the information contained in an applicant’s loan ﬁle.
The applicant information contained in the loan ﬁles is “hard” in the sense that it can be
transcribed. However, borrower information diﬀers in its degree of veriﬁability, and ranges
from audited ﬁnancials to information that requires a signiﬁcant degree of interpretation,
such as trade reference reports or a description of the applicant’s business (see Petersen (2004)
for a discussion). Although regulators require banks to collect an applicant’s tax record and
audited income statement, this information is often unreliable and diﬃcult to verify. New
applicants typically lack a credit score or established record of formal borrowing, which rules
out the use of predictive credit scoring, “scorecard lending” and other more systematic loan
approval technologies. Because the ticket size of a representative small business loan is small,
relative to the ﬁxed cost of underwriting, risk-management occurs primarily through ex-ante
screening, rather than prohibitively costly relationship lending or ex-post monitoring.
4.2 Loan Database
As a basis for the experiment, we requested a random sample of loan applications from a large
commercial lender in India (hereafter “the Lender”), and received 650 loan ﬁles. The loan ﬁles
contain all information available to the Lender at the time the application was processed, as
12well as at least nine months of repayment history for each loan9. The information contained
in each loan application can be grouped into the following categories, corresponding to the
sections of the Lender’s standard application format: (1) basic client information including
a detailed description of the client’s business, (2) documents and veriﬁcation (3) balance
sheet and (4) income statement. In addition, participants in the experiment had access to
three types of background checks for each applicant: (5) a site visit report on the applicant’s
business, (6) a site visit report on the applicant’s residence and (7) a credit bureau report,
available for 66% of all applicants. We limit our attention to uncollateralized small business
loans to self-employed individuals, with a ticket size between Rs 150,000 (US$ 3,000) and Rs
500,000 (US$ 10,000).10 Loan ﬁle summary statistics are reported in Table III. We consider
only term loans to new borrowers, many of whom are ﬁrst-time applicants for a formal
sector loan.11 The median loan in our database has a tenure of 36 months, a ticket size of
Rs 283,214 (US$ 6,383) and a monthly installment of Rs 9,228. (US$ 208).
To rule out vintage eﬀects and ensure consistency in the initial screening standards ap-
plied to loans used in the experiment, we restrict our sample to loans originated in 2009
Q1 and 2009 Q2. Based on the Lender’s proprietary data on the repayment history of each
loan, we then classiﬁed credit ﬁles into performing and non-performing loans. Following the
standard deﬁnition, we classify a loan as delinquent if it has missed two monthly payments
and remains 60+ days overdue, and as performing otherwise. To calculate proﬁtability to
9More than 90% of all defaults occur during the ﬁrst ﬁve months of a loan’s tenure, so that our default
measure allows for a relatively precise measurement of loan quality.
10While none of the loans in the experiment carried any collateral security, borrowers faced strong incentives
for repayment. First, the Lender routinely oﬀers follow-up loans at reduced interest rates to clients with a
good repayment history. Second, borrowers who default on their loans are reported to India’s main credit
bureau, implying a credible threat of future exclusion from bank credit. Loans that remain unsettled for
90+ days are classiﬁed as non-performing (NPA), reported to the credit bureau, and referred to the Lender’s
collections department. A small fraction of loans in the overdue category are restructured in negotiation
between clients and the Lender. To rule out selection bias, our sample excludes repeat borrowers and
restructured loans.
11Since none of the loans in our sample are collateralized, they are priced at an annual interest rate of
between 15 and 30 per cent. We control for the variation in interest rates by including loan ﬁxed eﬀects.
13the bank, we subtract the disbursal amount from the discounted stream of repayments.12 To
achieve as representative a sample as possible, we also include 26 credit ﬁles from clients who
applied, but were turned down by the Lender. For the incentive payouts in our study, these
rejected loans are treated as non-performing13. Throughout the analysis, we report results
disaggregated by non-performing and declined loans and show that our results are unaﬀected
by the classiﬁcation of loans declined ex-ante by the Lender. Importantly, the ﬁnal columns
of Table III show that loan ﬁles contain information that may be useful in distinguishing
good loans and bad loans, suggesting there are returns to eﬀort in this setting.
4.3 Loan Oﬃcers and Experimental Procedure
Loan oﬃcers were recruited from the active staﬀ of several leading private and public sector
commercial banks. Participants ﬁrst attended an introductory presentation, completed a
practice session, and then participated in up to 15 sessions of the experiment, in which they
evaluated six loan applications per session. Working conditions and presentation of informa-
tion were designed to closely resemble the actual work environment of the representative loan
oﬃcer.14 Experimental sessions were scheduled to last one hour, although participants could
ﬁnish early or late if they so chose. Incentive treatments, as described in Section 2, were
randomly and individually assigned at the loan oﬃcer and session level, such that oﬃcers
evaluated a batch of six loans under a given scheme.15 The experiments took over a year
to complete, and not all incentive schemes were eligible to be assigned in any given session.
12We estimate the Lender’s net proﬁt per loan as the net present value of the disbursal plus repayments
including interest, discounted by 8%, the approximate rate on Indian commercial paper between January 1
and December 31, 2009, and assuming a 10% recovery on defaulted loans.
13However, we do not include initially rejected loans in the proﬁtability calculations. In non-reported
results we also veriﬁed that our analysis is robust to the exclusion of rejected loans.
14Harrison, List and Towe (2007) point out that laboratory behavior may not match ﬁeld behavior when
eliciting risk attitudes (“background risk”). In contrast to that study, we use within-subject variation,
and the inclusion of loan oﬃcer ﬁxed-eﬀects may reduce the importance of heterogeneous perceptions of
background risk from diﬀerent subjects.
15The number of loan ﬁles was held constant to rule out multitasking concerns.
14Hence, our regressions include a set of ﬁxed eﬀects to control for these randomization strata.
At the start of each session, loan oﬃcers were assigned to an incentive treatment, received
a one-on-one introduction to the incentive scheme and completed a short questionnaire to
verify comprehension. We report summary statistics for the population of participating loan
oﬃcers in Table II, Columns (1) to (4). The median loan oﬃcer in our sample is a Level II
public sector bank employee who is 35 years old, and has 10 years of work experience. In
Table II, Columns (5) to (8) we report comparable characteristics from a sample of all loan
oﬃcers from a major bank in the state in which our experiment takes place. Our sample is
quite representative of this reference population in terms of age, rank and experience.
A customized software interface reproduced each section of the loan application on a
separate tab: a description of the applicant’s business, balance sheet, trade reference, site
visit report, document veriﬁcation and credit bureau report when available. While reviewing
this information, participants were asked to assess the applicant’s credit risk using a form
adapted from the standard format of a leading Indian commercial bank, with categories for
personal risk, business risk, management risk and ﬁnancial risk. The risk ratings serve three
purposes: ﬁrst, they add realism to the lab session, as completing an internal risk rating is a
routine part of evaluating applications; second, they allow us to elicit a measure of perceived
credit risk that is not tied to loan oﬃcer compensation. Finally, internal ratings serve to
assist the loan oﬃcer in aggregating information about the application in a systematic way.
Within each experimental session, the sequence of loan ﬁles was randomly assigned, but the
ratio of performing, non-performing and declined loans was held constant at four performing
loans, one non-performing loan and one loan declined by the Lender.16 Loan oﬃcers were
asked to evaluate these loans based on their best judgment, but were not given information
about the ratio of good and bad loans or the outcome of any particular loan under evaluation.
16We chose this ratio to match responses to a pilot survey, in which we elicited the expected distribution
of performing, non-performing and ex-ante declined loans for loans of the type used in the experiment.
155 Empirical Strategy and Results
Since treatment status was randomly assigned, our empirical strategy is straightforward and
we estimate treatment regressions of the form:
yil =
K−1 X
k=1
βkTilk + θi + θl + ζ
0Ril + ξ
0Xil + εil (1)
where yil is the outcome of interest for loan oﬃcer i and loan l, Til is a vector of treatment
dummies for the incentive schemes being compared to the baseline. In all regressions, we use
the low-powered baseline incentive wB = [20,0,10] as the omitted category. We additionally
control for loan oﬃcer ﬁxed eﬀects, θi, loan ﬁle ﬁxed eﬀects θl, and individual controls Xil,
including loan oﬃcer age, seniority, rank, education, and include dummies for whether the
loan oﬃcer has management and business experience. Finally, we include dummies for the
randomization strata, Ril. Standard errors are clustered at the loan oﬃcer-session level,17
the same level at which the treatment is assigned.
Our data set includes 14,369 lending decisions, representing 206 unique subjects, with
three key treatment conditions: (1) Low-powered incentives, which we use as the baseline
throughout the empirical analysis; (2) High-powered incentives, which reward loan oﬃcers
for approving loans that perform and penalizes the origination of loans that default; and (3)
Origination bonus, which rewards the loan oﬃcer for every originated loan.18
In addition to these incentive vectors, we vary conditions under which incentives are paid.
In 369 randomly selected sessions (2,214 loan evaluations), we defer incentive payments by 3
months, rather than paying immediately. In further 163 sessions (978 evaluations), we relax
the participant’s limited liability constraint by providing an initial information endowment
of Rs 200 (US$ 4.5), which can be lost if a loan oﬃcer makes a series of unproﬁtable lending
17Each session consists of one loan oﬃcer evaluating six ﬁles.
18Regressions using all data we collected, which includes the performance bonus schemes which pay only if
a loan performs, along with the appropriate treatment dummies, are reported in the supplementary appendix.
16decisions. Finally, in 137 sessions (3,638 loans), we provide loan oﬃcers with an initial
information endowment of Rs 108 (US$ 2.25), which they may spend to sections of the loan
ﬁle. Table I summarizes the sample sizes used for contrasts. Table OA.I in the supplementary
appendix reports a test of random assignment that compares loan oﬃcer characteristics
across treatments, and conﬁrms that the randomization was successful.
To test our hypotheses, we consider three groups of outcomes: (i) measures of screening
eﬀort, (ii) measures of subjective risk-assessment, and (iii) lending decisions (actual risk-
taking) and the resulting proﬁtability of originated loans. We construct two measures of
screening eﬀort: the number of credit ﬁle sections reviewed by a credit oﬃcer; and the amount
of money spent on reviewing additional information under the costly-information treatment.
To measure risk-assessment and risk-taking, we record internal risk ratings assigned to each
loan. Finally, to evaluate loan oﬃcer decisions and performance, we match the loan oﬃcer’s
lending decision to the actual proﬁtability of the loan to the ﬁnancial institution.
5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Before turning to the main analysis, we report descriptive statistics of loan evaluations during
the exercise. We ﬁrst verify that the experimental task is meaningful, in the sense that it is
indeed possible for loan oﬃcers to infer credit risk based on hard information contained in
an applicant’s loan ﬁle. To do this, Table III presents mean comparisons of loan application
information for performing and non-performing loans. As is evident from the test statistics
comparing hard information characteristics of performing and non-performing loans, there
are a number of systematic diﬀerences in these loan characteristics that help distinguish
ex-post proﬁtable from ex-post defaulting loans. In particular, borrowers who defaulted on
their loans had substantially lower revenue, younger businesses, higher ratios of monthly
debt service to income, compared to borrowers who remained current on their obligations.
17Overdues on credit reports also predicted default. Higher-quality borrowers did report higher
levels of debt, a fact consistent with the common observation of low-quality borrowers being
excluded from formal ﬁnancial markets.
Table IV reports summary statistics of loan evaluations by loan type and incentive.
We note the following. First, even for a group of highly experienced loan oﬃcers, making
proﬁtable lending decisions in this informationally challenging lending environment was not
a trivial task. On average, loan oﬃcers approved 75% of all loans evaluated in the experiment
and made correct lending decisions in 65% of all cases. Lending decisions were, however,
proﬁtable under all incentive schemes in the experiment and would have earned the bank
an average net present value of US$ 240 (5.9% of the median loan size) per originated
loan. Lending volume responds dramatically to incentives. Identifying performing loans
was substantially easier than identifying non-performing loans or loans that were rejected
by the Lender ex-ante. Changes in the incentive power of the contract were especially
eﬀective in improving loan oﬃcer’s success in detecting non-performing loans (Column (9)).
These patterns are directly reﬂected in the proﬁtability of loans approved under alternative
incentive schemes (Column (6)).
Table IV Column (2) describes the number of sections a loan oﬃcer reviewed prior to
making a decision, while Column (3) gives this number for only the subsample which was
charged to see additional sections from the loan ﬁle. Virtually all loan oﬃcers study the
basic information and borrower proﬁle sections. However, some chose to reject or accept a
loan prior to viewing the entire application, particularly when the incentive scheme did not
reward higher-quality screening. When information was costly, loan oﬃcers were most likely
to pay for income statements and balance sheet information, and much less likely to pay for
the site visit reports (results not reported in table).
In addition to observed lending decisions, we analyze loan oﬃcer risk assessment, as
measured by the rating each loan oﬃcer gave to each loan. Since these ratings themselves
18were not incentivized, one might be concerned about whether they contain useful information.
We report formal tests of the information content of internal ratings in Table OA.III in the
supplementary appendix. The results show that loan oﬃcer assessments of credit risk are a
meaningful and strongly signiﬁcant predictor of actual lending decisions, the probability of
default and the proﬁt of loans evaluated in the experiment. This is true for the overall rating
(Table OA.III, Panel A) as well as its sub-components measuring an applicant’s perceived
personal and ﬁnancial risk (Table OA.III, Panel B and C). A Kolgomorov-Smirnov test of
the equality of ratings for performing versus non-performing loans rejects at the 1% level.
Since loan oﬃcers complete multiple sessions, one might wonder whether loan oﬃcers
learn over the course of the study. An aﬃrmative answer might be cause for concern, given
that our average loan oﬃcer has over 13 years of experience lending. To verify that learning
over the course of the exercise poses no threat to the validity of our results, Figure 2 plots
the average fraction of correct decisions and average proﬁt per originated loan as a function
of the number of completed experimental sessions. These demonstrate no learning eﬀect, a
result conﬁrmed by regression results in Table OA.II in the supplementary appendix.
5.2 Incentivizing Screening Eﬀort
We ﬁrst analyze the eﬀect of incentives on screening eﬀort. Intuitively, performance incen-
tives can aﬀect the quality of lending decisions if they induce a loan oﬃcer to choose higher
screening eﬀort, translating into either the collection of borrower information that was not
previously available or a more thorough evaluation of available information. The design of
our experiment provides us with a straightforward measure of screening eﬀort, namely, the
thoroughness with which the loan oﬃcer reviews the loan ﬁle. Speciﬁcally, we record how
many of the ten sections of the credit ﬁle the loan oﬃcer chooses to review before mak-
ing a decision. In a separate set of sub-treatments meant to make the eﬀort trade-oﬀ even
19more stark to loan oﬃcers, we charge loan oﬃcers Rs 3 for each section of the loan dossier
beyond what would be available on the application form19. As human subject considera-
tions precluded an experimental design in which loan oﬃcers paid us to participate, in these
treatments we provide each loan oﬃcer with an initial information endowment of Rs 108
(approximately US$ 2.25 per experimental session). Participants could choose not to pay to
view additional tabs, in which case Rs 108 would be paid to them at the end of the session,
in addition to whatever show-up and incentive payments they earn. This information cost
was not trivial: purchasing access to all six tabs would cost close to the maximum payout
of 20 under the low-powered and origination incentive schemes. We use the amount spent
to view loan sections as a second measure of screening eﬀort, capturing the notion of costly
information. Because screening eﬀort is not observable to the bank, we do not tie bonus
payments to measures of observed eﬀort.
Table V reports the eﬀect of performance pay on screening eﬀort, measured by the number
of loan ﬁle sections reviewed when the only cost of eﬀort was the loan oﬃcer’s time (Columns
(1) and (2)), as well as when the loan oﬃcer was required to pay to view additional tabs
(Columns (3) and (4)). High-powered incentives signiﬁcantly increase screening eﬀort. On
average, loan oﬃcers facing high-powered incentives viewed .4 additional tabs of information
when there was no charge to view tabs (the mean number of tabs viewed was 5.06 when
information was free, and 3.99 when information was costly). When information was costly,
high-powered incentives had an even stronger eﬀect, increasing the average number of tabs
viewed by .8-1.2. These eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant across all speciﬁcations. Interest-
ingly, we do not observe eﬀort to be signiﬁcantly lower when loan oﬃcers face origination
bonuses, although the standard errors are not small enough to rule out meaningful eﬀects.
These results conﬁrm that loan oﬃcers respond strongly to monetary incentives, and suggest
19Available for free were basic applicant details and documentation provided by the borrower. Loan oﬃcers
paid for income statement and balance sheet information, residential and business site visit reports, and trade
and credit reference checks.
20that performance pay can incentivize eﬀort in the review of borrower information.
5.3 Risk-Assessment and Risk-Taking
How do performance incentives aﬀect the perception of credit risk and actual risk-taking?
Risk-assessment is easy to measure, as each loan oﬃcer is required to enter an internal rating
for each loan they evaluate. Before participants made a decision to approve or decline a loan,
they were asked to assess the merit of the application along 15 credit-scoring criteria adapted
from the standard internal credit scoring format of an Indian bank. Internal ratings range
from 0 to 100 and a higher score indicates higher credit quality, i.e. lower default risk.
Internal ratings were not binding for the loan oﬃcer’s decision. That is, an applicant did
not have to attain a minimum score to be considered for a loan. This approach is common
practice for consumer and small-enterprise loans for which the bank records internal ratings
but does not use predictive credit scoring in the approval process.
In Table VI we ﬁrst present evidence on the eﬀect of incentives on the perception of
credit risk. We ﬁnd strong evidence that the structure of performance incentives distorts
the subjective assessment of credit risk. Loan oﬃcers facing incentives that reward loan
origination inﬂate internal ratings by as much as .16 standard deviations. In the speciﬁcation
with loan oﬃcer and loan ﬁxed eﬀects (Table VI, Column (2)), we see that the size of the
coeﬃcient increases in direct proportion to the incentive that is placed on origination. This
is particularly striking for the treatments that paid Rs 50 or Rs 100 (US$ 2.25) only if a loan
was made and performed, and zero otherwise. Facing this incentive scheme, loan oﬃcers
inﬂate internal ratings by up to .3 standard deviations (signiﬁcant at the 5 percent or better
level across all speciﬁcations). Taken together, these ﬁndings provide strong evidence in
support of a behavioral view of performance pay in lending as suggested, for example, by
Barberis (2012): incentives that reward origination do not merely aﬀect the propensity to
21take on risk, but in fact distort loan oﬃcer judgment and the perception of credit risk.
We next turn to the eﬀect of performance pay on risk-taking. Because the realized
outcome of a loan may be a poor proxy of the ex-ante riskiness at the time a loan is originated,
we construct a measure of ex-ante risk, by averaging the internal ratings of all loan oﬃcers
who observed a given ﬁle under the baseline incentive. We call this the “loan’s average
rating.” We also calculate the coeﬃcient of variation for the baseline internal score, which
is a measure of the degree of disagreement of loan oﬃcers about the riskiness of the loan.
If high-powered incentives encourage more discerning lending decisions, they will lead loan
oﬃcers to approve loans with higher average rating and a lower variance. (Indeed, in our
data set, the coeﬃcient of variation is strongly correlated with default.)
Table VII tests this hypothesis. Rather than using the loan outcome, which is a noisy
measure and depends on idiosyncratic risk, we take advantage of the fact that we had over
100 loan oﬃcers rate each loan. We therefore deﬁne two measures of the riskiness of a loan,
based on the ratings given by the loan oﬃcers who evaluated loans under the baseline, low-
powered incentive scheme. The ﬁrst measure is simply the mean risk rating. The second is the
coeﬃcient of variation of the risk rating, which measures the degree of ex-ante disagreement
about the quality of a loan.
In the regressions in Table VII, we restrict the sample to loans which a loan oﬃcer ap-
proved; thus the coeﬃcients give the average risk rating of loans approved under a particular
incentive scheme. We ﬁnd that high-powered incentives lead to more conservative lending,
though this result is signiﬁcant only for the measure of business and ﬁnancial risk (Columns
(5) and (6)). We also ﬁnd that high-powered incentives cause loan oﬃcers to shy away from
loans that are risky in the sense that there is greater ex-ante disagreement about the inter-
pretation of information contained in the loan ﬁle, as reﬂected in greater variance of a loan’s
baseline risk rating. Loans approved under high-powered incentives are characterized by a
signiﬁcantly lower coeﬃcient of variation of their baseline rating.
225.4 Lending Decisions and Loan-Level Proﬁt
In Table VIII, we turn to the impact of performance pay on lending decisions and loan
level proﬁt. Loan oﬃcers facing origination and repayment bonuses, which do not penal-
ize defaulting loans, are dramatically more likely to approve loan applications, on average
(Columns (1) and (2)). The shift from the baseline condition to high-powered incentives
leads to only slightly more conservative lending decisions, with the share of loans approved
dropping 3.6 and .04%, signiﬁcant at the 10% level for the speciﬁcation without loan or
loan oﬃcer ﬁxed eﬀects. This is a small eﬀect relative to the mean acceptance rate of 71%
under the baseline. Incentive schemes that reward origination, on the other hand, result in
a dramatic increase in the probability of approval. Under the origination bonus treatment,
loan approvals increase by approximately 8 percentage points, statistically signiﬁcant at the
1% level. The probability of approval increases monotonically for the two repayment bonus
incentives, with the probability of approval increasing by 9–13.5 and 12.2–15.4 percentage
points, respectively.
Of course, incentivizing more or less lending is relatively easy; the more interesting ques-
tion is whether incentives can make loan oﬃcers more discerning. Table VIII, Columns (3)
and (4) show that laxer incentives increase the fraction of good loan clients who are approved,
roughly in proportion to the overall eﬀect on lending. We ﬁnd a dramatically diﬀerent pat-
tern for non-performing loans: loan oﬃcers facing the high-powered incentive scheme are 11
percentage points less likely to approve these bad loans, a result that is signiﬁcant at the
ﬁve percent level in column (5), despite the smaller sample size. In contrast, we ﬁnd large
increases in the fraction of non-performing loans approved under an incentive scheme that
does not penalize poor screening decisions. The pattern is similar for the sample of loans that
were initially rejected by the bank, though the statistical signiﬁcance of the high-powered
incentive eﬀect is lost.
23In Table VIII, Columns (9) to (12), we study the eﬀect of performance pay on the
proﬁtability of bank lending. Our ﬁrst measure is the net present value to the lender of
repayments, less the amount disbursed, restricting the sample to loans approved by our
experimental subjects.20 This measure is relevant for a lending institution that seeks to
maximize average proﬁtability per loan made, such as a capital-constrained lender. Columns
(9) and (10) show that high-powered incentives dramatically improve the proﬁtability of
lending, raising proﬁt per loan by US$ 149 to US$ 176 per loan, approximately 5% of the
median loan size. In the ﬁnal two columns, we consider proﬁt per screened loan, setting the
NPV of a loan that is rejected by an experimental subject to zero. This measure makes most
sense for a lender whose lending opportunities may be limited, perhaps because they face
diﬃculty sourcing additional clients. Again, we ﬁnd that high-powered incentives improve
proﬁtability by roughly similar magnitudes, though the result is only statistically signiﬁcant
in the speciﬁcation with loan oﬃcer ﬁxed-eﬀects.
In our setting, the net interest margin is quite high (around 30%), so one might be con-
cerned that high-powered incentives lead loan oﬃcers to behave too conservatively, declining
proﬁtable loans. In fact, we observe that high-powered incentives improve the quality of orig-
ination, and are therefore likely a proﬁtable proposition from the bank’s perspective, even
when screening costs, reduced volume, and the cost of the incentive payments themselves,
are taken into consideration.
5.5 Deferred Compensation
Eﬀorts to regulate the compensation of loan originators have often focused on the alleged
“short-termism” present in many performance contracts in banking and have therefore aimed
at extending the time-horizon of the incentive payments. If loan oﬃcers have higher discount
20Because we do not observe the outcome of loans ﬁles that were originally rejected by the lender, we do
not include these loans in our proﬁt calculations.
24rates than shareholders, however, deferred compensation will blunt the eﬀect of incentives.21
In this subsection, we test how the eﬀects of incentive payments vary when the time
horizon of payouts is changed. It is worth noting that any compensation that varies with
loan repayment must be paid with some delay, as it takes time to observe whether loans
perform or not. The intent of our experimental treatments is to vary the extent of this
delay in performance based compensation. We are primarily interested in understanding
whether deferred compensation weakens incentives for costly screening eﬀort. We therefore
restrict attention to the subset of “costly information” treatments, in which loan oﬃcers
pay to access additional sections of the loan application. We operationalize the concept
of deferred compensation by comparing loan oﬃcer behavior under immediate performance
pay (for low-powered, high-powered and origination incentives) to behavior under a series of
treatments, in which incentive payments were awarded after a period of 90 days.22
Table IX presents the results of the deferred compensation intervention. In Panel A, we
report the eﬀect of deferred compensation on screening eﬀort. Panel B reports on the eﬀect
of deferred compensation on risk-taking, and treatment eﬀects of deferred compensation
on loan-level proﬁts are reported in Panel C. Note that in contrast to the previous tables,
the omitted category and relevant basis for comparison here is the low-powered treatment
with costly information. At the foot of the table, we report t-tests comparing the eﬀect of
immediate versus deferred compensation. Consistent with the predictions of our model, the
results show that deferred compensation signiﬁcantly weakens the impact of high-powered
incentives. This is most apparent in the eﬀect of deferred incentives on screening eﬀort, as
measured by loan sections purchased (Table IX, Columns (3) and (4)). In Column (3), the
diﬀerence between immediate high-powered incentive payments and the exact same payments
deferred 90 days is large, [1.225 - (-.454)], and signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. While
21One need not assume loan oﬃcers are impatient: credit-constraints or concern about separation from
employers could also cause loan oﬃcers to discount future payments at high rates.
22Loan oﬃcers were given the option of collecting cash payments or receiving a check by mail.
25high-powered incentives drive loan oﬃcers to lend more conservatively (Columns (5) and
(6)), deferring those same payments attenuates this eﬀect. High-powered incentives lead
loan oﬃcers to shy away from loans that appear riskier ex-ante, irrespective of whether the
high-powered incentives are deferred (Columns (7) and (8)). Finally, the point estimates of
proﬁtability are lower for deferred weak (baseline) incentives, as well as the high-powered
incentives, though the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant (at the 10% level) only for weak incentives.
5.6 Relaxing Limited Liability
Just as banks beneﬁting from deposit insurance and other implicit guarantees may be
tempted to take high-risk, low-NPV gambles, so too might front-line loan oﬃcers seeking
to maximize their variable compensation. To test how the presence of limited liability, an
inherent characteristic of virtually all incentive contracts for loan originators, aﬀects loan
oﬃcer behavior, we randomly assigned loan oﬃcers to a treatment in which participants re-
ceived an initial endowment of Rs 200 (US$ 4.5) at the beginning of each session, which was
theirs to take home unless their incentive payments for the session were negative, in which
case the amount of penalties would be deducted from the endowment. The worst outcome
possible for a loan oﬃcer would be to approve two bad loans and decline four good loans
under the high-powered incentive, in which case incentive payments would be Rs -200. The
endowment therefore completely relaxed the limited liability constraint for the session.
Table X presents the results. We ﬁnd evidence to suggest that relaxing limited liability
indeed increases loan oﬃcers’ screening eﬀort (Columns (3) and (4)), though the diﬀerences
are not statistically signiﬁcant. Surprisingly, loan oﬃcers approve loans that appear to be
on average lower quality (Column 5) when limited liability is relaxed. When taking lending
decisions, loan oﬃcers are more conservative without limited liability, though the size of this
diﬀerence is modest (the diﬀerence in coeﬃcients in Column (7) is 2.9 percentage points) and
26not statistically signiﬁcant. Interestingly, we are unable to detect any systematic diﬀerence
in the proﬁtability of lending to banks under either scheme. Taken together, these results
suggest that ensuring loan oﬃcers have more skin in the game has at most modest eﬀects
on eﬀort and lending decisions.
5.7 Do Loan Oﬃcer Characteristics Matter?
The analysis thus far shows that the structure of performance incentives has important eﬀects
on loan oﬃcer behavior. However, individual ability, experience, and other characteristics
may play an important role in determining how loan oﬃcers make lending decisions, as well
as how they respond to incentives. In any real-world setting, without random assignment,
it would be diﬃcult to tease apart the relationship between individual characteristics and
performance: for example, higher-ranking individuals may have more advisory support, or be
assigned to make decisions on loans that are more risky or informationally opaque. A virtue
of our experiment is that we observe loan oﬃcers with a variety of demographic and personal
characteristics perform an identical task under identical, exogenously assigned conditions.
Previous literature has used various measures to identify determinants of success, often
in entrepreneurial activities. Among the traits and dispositions that repeatedly appear as
good predictors are biological determinants, such as IQ, gender, and age (see, for example,
Djankov et al. (2007), Landier and Thesmar (2009)). Related literature documents cultural
predictors, such as occupation of the parent and ethnic ties. The psychology literature has
also identiﬁed broad personality factors associated with entrepreneurial start-up and success,
such as risk taking, neuroticism and the need to be motivated to achieve (de Mel, McKenzie
and Woodruﬀ (2009), Zhao and Seibert (2006)). Although there is much reason to believe
that, similar to many other tasks that require a tradeoﬀ between risk and return, patterns of
loan oﬃcer decision making are likely to be inﬂuenced by personal characteristics, we are not
27aware of any prior evidence on what personality characteristics predict success in lending.23
In this section, we explore these open empirical question by considering, ﬁrst, the eﬀect of
personal attributes on loan oﬃcer decision making and, second, heterogeneity in the response
to performance incentives among loan oﬃcers with diﬀerent demographic characteristics.
5.7.1 Loan Oﬃcer Characteristics and Lending Decisions
Before we explore heterogeneity in the response to incentives, Table XI examines how lending
decisions vary with loan oﬃcer characteristics. To do this, we augment equation 1 with a
demographic characteristic, such as age or gender, or the measurement of a personality
trait. We omit other loan oﬃcer characteristics from the regression, but continue to include
treatment dummies, as well as week and randomization stratum ﬁxed eﬀects.
The results are intriguing and demonstrate that demographic characteristic and person-
ality traits signiﬁcantly aﬀect loan oﬃcer behavior. A loan oﬃcer’s age has a small, but
perceptible eﬀect on internal ratings and loan approvals: a loan oﬃcer ten years older rates
a ﬁle, on average, .06 standard deviations higher quality, and is one percentage point more
likely to approve a given loan application. The largest eﬀects appear in loan oﬃcer eﬀort.
Loan oﬃcers with the highest rank (5/5) spend, on average, Rs 12 more per session (from a
mean of 24) on reviewing costly information than loan oﬃcers at the lowest rank (1/5).
A large literature examines the performance of private versus government-owned banks
(see, for example, LaPorta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) and Cole (2009)). An
unanswered question in that literature is whether incentives alone can explain diﬀerences
in performance, or whether the type of person working in a public sector undertaking may
behave diﬀerently. Table XI shows that employees of private sector banks work harder
(are willing to pay a higher cost to observe information), and rate the same loans higher.
Importantly, they also seem to make better decisions: they are more likely to accept good
23For a comprehensive review of the related psychology literature, see Frese and Rauch (2007).
28loans, no more likely to accept bad loans, and their decisions are on average $75 (or 2.2%
percent of the median loan size) more proﬁtable than the decisions of public sector bankers.
We next examine whether lending behavior can be predicted by standard measures of
personality traits. Following the experiment, we asked 53 loan oﬃcers to complete a standard
personality test (John, Donahue and Kentle (1991)).24 While these measures have been
validated and are widely used in experimental economics, to the best of our knowledge this is
the ﬁrst application in ﬁnance. We ﬁnd that personality matters: agreeable and conscientious
individuals spend signiﬁcantly more on costly information, while neurotic individuals shirk.
Personality also aﬀects ratings, and the ability to correctly identify good loans. These
eﬀects are economically meaningful: a loan oﬃcer at the 75th percentile of the agreeability
distribution will approve 4.3 percentage points more good loans than an individual at the
25th percentile of the agreeableness distribution. Two of the ﬁve personality measures predict
proﬁtability: extroverts make better decisions, while more neurotic individuals turn down so
many good loans that their average proﬁtability is lower.
Finally, we analyze the eﬀect of risk aversion and patience (more patient individuals
have lower discount rates) on behavior. We ﬁnd that, on average, risk averse individuals
spend less on costly information, but are more likely to approve both good and bad loans,
though the latter eﬀects are small (the inter quartile range for risk aversion on accepting
good applications is 1.2 percentage points).
In summary, loan oﬃcer identity seems to matter. Diﬀerent individuals, facing the iden-
tical information set and identical incentives, behave quite diﬀerently, with important conse-
quences for lending. In the ﬁnal section, we turn to the possibility that the incentive schemes
themselves have heterogeneous eﬀects.
24Summary statistics of these characteristics are given in Table II, Panel B.
295.7.2 Loan Oﬃcer Characteristics and the Response to Incentives
Does the response of credit oﬃcers to incentives vary with individual characteristics, such
as age or experience? Table XII reports regressions which augment equation (1) with a loan
oﬃcer characteristic, and interact that characteristic with treatment dummies. Because
there are many more interactions possible than the scope of this paper allows us to report,
we focus on what we believe are the most salient characteristics.25
Panel A examines whether the eﬀect of incentives varies with the age of the loan oﬃcer.26
The odd columns present the main eﬀect of age and the incentive schemes, while the even
columns report the interaction between age and incentives. We ﬁnd that older oﬃcers rate
loans higher, but that their ratings are less responsive to incentives: particularly, when faced
with an origination bonus, a 50 year old loan oﬃcer increases average ratings 40% less than
a 30 year-old loan oﬃcer.
Turning to rank, we ﬁnd that the lowest ranking loan oﬃcers barely reduce expenditures
on information when faced with an origination bonus scheme, but higher ranked loan oﬃcers
decrease their expenditures substantially. Perhaps the most signiﬁcant diﬀerence in response
to incentives occur by gender. Men rate loans higher, but women inﬂate ratings signiﬁcantly
more when facing origination bonuses. Men also accept a signiﬁcantly higher fraction of loans
under low-powered incentives (.06). While women make more lenient lending decisions under
high-powered incentives, men become stricter. Finally, women respond to the origination
bonus by increasing their acceptance rates dramatically more than men. While the previous
section showed private sector bankers behave dramatically diﬀerently, Panel D suggests that
they respond in generally similar ways to incentives. One exception is in Column (2): private
bankers act more like homo oeconomicus, reducing expenditure of information much more
than public sector bankers when faced with origination bonuses. Finally, we note that, at
25Additional interaction results are reported in the working paper version.
26We divide age by 10 to avoid very small coeﬃcients.
30least if evaluated by their willingness to pay a cost to obtain more information, agreeable
loan oﬃcers make better employees. They also shirk approximately one-fourth less when
facing the origination incentive.
Risk aversion and time preferences (not reported) do not have dramatic impact on the
eﬃcacy of incentive schemes (results available in working paper). The eﬀect of incentives
appears generally to be weaker on individuals with lower discount rates. However, we do not
ﬁnd that risk-averse individuals become particularly conservative in lending decisions when
faced with the high-powered incentive scheme.
In short, we ﬁnd some evidence of the heterogeneous eﬀect of incentives, though we are
not persuaded that the weight of the evidence is strong enough to recommend that banks
provide diﬀerent incentive schemes for diﬀerent types of people. In contrast, the ﬁrst-order
eﬀects of individual characteristics on lending behavior are quite meaningful. Incentive
contracts may be important in helping banks attract workers whose personal characteristics
are compatible with proﬁtable lending.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
Recent research has presented convincing evidence that incentives rewarding loan origination
may cause severe agency problems and increase credit risk, either by inducing lax screening
standards Agarwal and Ben-David (2012), or by tempting loan oﬃcers to game approval
cutoﬀs even when such cutoﬀs are based on hard information (Berg, Puri and Rocholl, 2012).
Yet, to date there has been no evidence on whether performance-based compensation can
remedy these problems. The literature is similarly silent on the degree to which contracting
constraints inherent to the structure of performance incentives in lending, such as deferred
compensation and limited liability, aﬀect how loan oﬃcers respond to pay-for-performance.
In this paper, we analyze the underwriting process of small-business loans in an emerging
31market, using a series of experiments with experienced loan oﬃcers from Indian commercial
banks. The loan ﬁles evaluated in these experiments consist of the loan applications of
entrepreneurs seeking their ﬁrst commercial loan, which requires extensive screening eﬀort
and is therefore particularly sensitive to loan oﬃcer judgment.
We provide the ﬁrst rigorous test of theories of loan oﬃcer decision-making, using evidence
from a series of randomized experiments. Because our experimental design allows us to
capture normally unobservable aspects of loan oﬃcer behavior, such as eﬀort spent in the
evaluation of borrower information, we directly measure the relationship between incentives,
eﬀort, and performance. We additionally observe loan oﬃcers’ subjective risk-assessment,
which allows us to trace the impact of incentives on the perception of credit risk.
Comparing three commonly implemented classes of incentive schemes, we ﬁnd a strong
and economically signiﬁcant impact of monetary incentives on screening eﬀort, risk-assessment,
and the proﬁtability of originated loans. High-powered incentives that penalize the origina-
tion of non-performing loans while rewarding proﬁtable lending decisions cause loan oﬃcers
to exert greater screening eﬀort, approve fewer loans and increase the proﬁts per originated
loan. In line with the predictions of a simple model of incentives and loan oﬃcer decision-
making, these eﬀects are attenuated when deferred compensation is introduced. Interestingly,
we ﬁnd that incentives aﬀect not only actual risk-taking, but also loan oﬃcers’ subjective
perception of credit risk: more permissive incentive schemes lead loan oﬃcers to rate loans
as signiﬁcantly less risky than the same loans evaluated under pay-for-performance.
While we acknowledge that there are limitations to our set up as compared to a pure ﬁeld
experiment, the data in this study represent the allocation of approximately US$ 88 million in
credit, something that would be diﬃcult to achieve in a ﬁeld experiment. The combination of
a lab and ﬁeld experiment enables us to ask loan oﬃcers with very diﬀerent backgrounds and
skills to evaluate exactly the same loans under exogenously assigned incentives and allows
us to measure aspects of loan oﬃcer behavior that would otherwise be unobservable, such
32as screening eﬀort in the evaluation of borrower information and the subjective assessment
of credit risk. The experiments in this paper thus represent the ﬁrst step of an ambitious
agenda to fully understand the loan underwriting process.
Lenders have increasingly relied on credit scoring models rather than human judgment.
But it is unclear whether credit scoring models can outperform human judgment, particularly
in informationally opaque credit markets, such as the one we study. Nor is it obvious what
individual characteristics are associated with screening ability and to what extent they help
or hinder the use of performance incentives as a tool to manage credit-risk in commercial
lending. The results in this paper provide a ﬁrst step in answering these important questions.
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A Simple Model of Loan Oﬃcer Decision Making
To guide the analysis, we describe a simple model that highlights the key frictions that
may prevent the implementation of the optimal contract, and describes how changes in loan
oﬃcer incentives aﬀect screening behavior and lending decisions.
Agents. The model encompasses ﬁrms, loan oﬃcers, and the bank. The bank is risk-
neutral, while loan oﬃcers are risk-averse with uw > 0 and uww < 0. Firms seek to borrow
1 unit of capital from the bank. They invest in a project which either succeeds, generating
income, or fails, leaving zero residual value. There are two types of ﬁrms: good ﬁrms of type
θG with probability of investment success p, and bad ﬁrms of type θB, with probability of
investment success 0. The ex-ante fraction of good ﬁrms is π. We assume that the bank has
a net cost of capital normalized to 0, and charges interest rate r > 0. If the bank makes a
loan that is repaid, it therefore earns net interest margin r. If the loan defaults, the bank
loses 1 unit of capital. If the bank were to lend 1 unit of capital to all applicants, a loan
would be repaid with probability πp and earning expected return πp(1+r)−1. We assume
this amount to be negative, so that it is not proﬁtable for the bank to lend to all applicants.
Information and Screening. While a ﬁrm’s type is not observed, a loan oﬃcer may screen
a loan application in an attempt to determine the ﬁrm’s type. This requires eﬀort, which
comes at private cost e > 0 to the loan oﬃcer. We additionally allow for the possibility that
an intrinsically motivated loan oﬃcer derives non-pecuniary utility m ≥ 0 from screening,
and assume that both e and m are speciﬁc to an individual loan oﬃcer and independent
of monetary incentives. If a loan oﬃcer engages in screening, she observes either a fully
informative bad news signal, σB, indicating that the ﬁrm is type θB, and will default with
certainty , or the “no bad news” signal σG. Bad ﬁrms generate a bad signal with probability
34γ, and a good signal with probability 1-γ. Good ﬁrms generate a good signal with certainty.
Hence, the probability of observing a bad signal conditional on ﬁrm type is
P(σB) =
(
γ if borroweristype θB
0 if borroweristype θG
It follows that the posterior probability of a ﬁrm being bad after receiving a bad signal is
P(θB|σB) = 1, and the probability of the ﬁrm being good after observing a good signal is
P(θG|σG) = π
π+(1−γ)(1−π). We assume that it is proﬁtable to lend to a ﬁrm with a good
signal, even when screening costs are taken into consideration, so that
π {pr + (1 − p)(−1)} + (1 − π){γ · 0 + (1 − γ)(−1)} ≥ e − m (A.2)
Contracts. The bank may oﬀer the loan oﬃcer a contract w = [w,wD,w] to induce screening
eﬀort. The contract speciﬁes a payment w for declining a loan application, and contingent
payments for approving a loan that subsequently performs wP and for approving a loan that
subsequently defaults, wD, where wP,w ∈ [0,r] and wD ∈ [−1,0]. The bank’s problem is to
choose w = [wP,wD,w] to maximize proﬁtability. The bank does not observe the outcome
of a loan that is screened out by the loan oﬃcer.
Expected Utility. Loan oﬃcers choose the return to three possible actions: declining a loan
without screening, approving the loan without screening, or screening the loan application
and approving the loan only if no bad signal is observed. We consider the outcome of each
action in turn. If a loan oﬃcer rejects a loan without screening, her expected utility is simply
uR = u(w). If the loan oﬃcer approves a loan without screening, her expected utility is
uNS = πpu(wP) + (1 − πp)u(wD) (A.3)
35If an oﬃcer screens and approves only when no negative signal is observed, her utility is27
uS = πpu(wP) + {1 − πp − γ(1 − π)}u(wD) + {(1 − π)γ}u(w) − e + m (A.4)
Incentive Compatibility. We begin by remarking that, in the case of a risk-neutral loan
oﬃcer with unlimited wealth, the eﬃcient outcome can be obtained by setting w = [r,−1,0],
eﬀectively selling the loan to the loan oﬃcer and making her the residual claimant. However,
in practice this contract is expensive for the bank (as it gives the entire proﬁt from the loan
to the loan oﬃcer) and not feasible in practice, as the loan oﬃcer would be liable for the
total amount of the loan in case of default. Hence, if the bank is to motivate the loan oﬃcer
to exert screening eﬀort, it needs to oﬀer a contract that satisﬁes two incentive constraints:
uS ≥ uNS and uS ≥ uR. The ﬁrst constraint requires that the returns to eﬀort be greater
than the cost of eﬀort. This condition simpliﬁes to:
γ {u(w) − u(wD)}(1 − π) + m ≥ ˜ e (A.5)
The second constraint requires that the loan oﬃcer prefer screening to declining all loans:
πpu(wP) + {1 − πp + γ(π − 1)}u(wD) − {1 + γ(π − 1)}u(w) + m ≥ ˆ e (A.6)
In practice, since both constraints are upper bounds for the cost of eﬀort, only one will
bind. Nevertheless, the fact that wD and w slacken one constraint while tightening the
other suggests it may be diﬃcult to obtain the optimal incentive scheme, and indeed the
parameter space admits ranges such that proﬁtable lending is not possible. No matter which
constraint binds, it is always weakly easier to induce eﬀort when the cost of eﬀort is lower,
27From these conditions, we can also derive the proﬁt of the bank in each case. If a loan oﬃcer rejects a loan
without screening, the bank’s proﬁt is ΠR = −w. If the loan oﬃcer approves a loan without screening, the
bank’s proﬁt is ΠNS = πp(r−wP)−(1−πp)(1+wD), and if the loan oﬃcer screens and approves a loan only if
no bad signal is observed, expected proﬁt is ΠS = πp(r−wP)−[π(1−p)+(1−π)(1−γ)](1+wD)−[(1−π)γ]w.
36the penalty for making a non-performing loan increases, and the outside option of declining
a loan decreases. The eﬀect of increasing wP depends on which incentive compatibility
constraint binds. Loan oﬃcers can always be induced to lend, although not necessarily in a
manner that is proﬁtable for the bank.
In the experiment, we focus on the following testable predictions that characterize incen-
tive schemes commonly employed in commercial lending. Taken literally, the model predicts
that loan oﬃcers will either screen all loans, or not screen any loans. However, a simple
extension in which e varies by loan, in a way that is observable only to the loan oﬃcer,
would generate non-corner solution in screening eﬀort, and the following comparative statics
with respect to the average eﬀort level exerted by a loan oﬃcer.
Proposition 1 (Incentive power) ∂˜ e
∂wD and ∂ˆ e
∂wD < 0 and ∂˜ e
∂wP > 0. An origination piece rate,
as often employed in commercial lending, leads to low screening eﬀort, indiscriminate lend-
ing and high default rates. By contrast, high-powered incentives that reward the origination
of performing loans while penalizing the approval of bad loans lead to greater eﬀort, more
conservative lending and lower defaults.
Proposition 2 (Deferred compensation) Let δ ∈ (0,1) denote the time discount rate of
loan oﬃcer i. Then δu < u ∀ δ. Deferred compensation weakens the incentive power of any
performance based contract for a loan oﬃcer with a positive discount rate, as the cost of
eﬀort is not discounted while monetary rewards are.
Proposition 3 (Limited liability) Because ∂˜ e
∂wD and ∂ˆ e
∂wD < 0, increasing a loan oﬃcer’s
liability for non-performing loans from wD ≥ 0 to wD ∈ (−r,0) leads to greater screening
eﬀort. More generally, relaxing the limited liability constraint increases the incentive power
of any performance based contract.
Proposition 4 (Intrinsic motivation). ∂˜ e
∂m and ∂ˆ e
∂m > 0. The smaller the utility cost of
scrutinizing and the stronger the loan oﬃcer’s intrinsic motivation the greater will be the
oﬃcer’s observed screening eﬀort, irrespective of the incentive power of the contract.
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Figure 1: Loan Oﬃcer Performance
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Notes: This ﬁgure shows the distribution of loan oﬃcer performance, measured by the average percentage
of correct decisions per session under the Baseline treatment. The line plots the Kernel density of the
performance distribution. We deﬁne a correct lending decision as approving an ex-post performing loan or
declining an ex-post non-performing loan.
44Figure 2: Learning During the Experiment
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(b) Proﬁtability of Lending Decisions
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Notes: This ﬁgure examines the presence of learning eﬀects over the course of the experiment by plotting (a)
the percentage of correct decisions by the total number of experimental sessions completed and (b) the proﬁt per
approved loan by the number of experimental sessions completed. A correct lending decision is deﬁned as a loan
oﬃcer correctly approving a performing loan or correctly declining a loan that became delinquent. The dashed lines
and shaded areas are Kernel-weighted local polynomial regressions with corresponding 95% conﬁdence intervals.
45Figure 3: Distribution of Internal Ratings
(a) Non-performing Loans
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Notes: This ﬁgure plots the distribution of internal ratings assigned to loans evaluated under the baseline treatment.
Panel (a) shows the distribution of risk-ratings for the sample of non-performing loans and loans that were declined
by the Lender ex-ante; panel (b) plots the distribution for performing loans. Vertical lines show the median of the
distribution. A Kolgomorov-Smirnov test rejects equality of distributions at 1% (p-value<0.001).
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47Table II: Loan Oﬃcer Summary Statistics
Panel A reports demographic summary statistics of the participants (Columns (1) to (4)), comparing experiment par-
ticipants to the staﬀ of all loan oﬃcers of a large public sector bank in the state in which the experiment was carried
out (Columns (5) to (8)). Rank is the loan oﬃcer’s seniority level in the bank ranging from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest).
Experience is the total number of years the participant has been employed with the bank. Branch Manager is a dummy
variable indicating whether the participant has ever served as a branch manager or in a comparable management role.
Business Experience is a dummy variable taking on a value of 1 if a loan oﬃcer reports having any previous business
experience outside banking. Panel B shows summary statistics for the subsample of loan oﬃcers that completed the
personality test.
Panel A
Experiment participants [N=209] Bank sample [N=3,111]
N Mean Median StdDev N Mean Median StdDev
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Male 206 0.90 1.00 0.30 3,111 0.9 1.00 0.30
Age 206 37.60 35.00 10.94 3,111 37.9 35.00 12.0
Education [Master’s degree] 200 0.33 0.00 0.47 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Experience [Years] 206 12.76 10.00 11.30 3,111 13.90 11.00 13.00
Rank [1 (Lowest) - 5 (Highest)] 206 1.94 2.00 1.00 3,111 1.60 2.00 0.75
Branch Manager Experience 206 0.33 0.00 0.47 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Business Experience Indicator 206 .47 0.00 .50 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Private Sector Banker 206 0.20 0.00 0.40
Panel B
Experiment participants
with personality test [N=53]
N Mean Median StdDev
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BFI Extroversion 50 3.46 3.38 0.53
BFI Agreeableness 50 3.90 3.89 0.51
BFI Conscientiousness 50 3.92 3.94 0.62
BFI Neuroticism 50 2.64 2.69 0.66
BFI Openness 50 3.60 3.55 0.51
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50Table V: The Eﬀect of Incentives on Eﬀort
This table reports treatment eﬀects of performance pay on screening eﬀort. Each column reports
results from a separate regression. The omitted treatment category is the low-powered baseline
incentive. The dependent variable in Column (1) and (2) is number of sections of the loan ﬁle
viewed; the dependent variable in Columns (3) and (4) is the number of loan ﬁle sections reviewed
when loan oﬃcers were required to pay for additional information. The regressions in Columns (1)
and (2) include the entire sample, while Columns (3) and (4) limit the data to evaluations to the
“costly information setting.” All regressions include a lab ﬁxed eﬀect, randomization stratum and
week ﬁxed eﬀects, as well as dummies to control for treatment conditions not reported in this table.
Loan oﬃcer controls include age, seniority, rank, education, and indicators for branch manager and
business experience. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the loan oﬃcer × session level.
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
Free information Costly information
Loan ﬁle Loan ﬁle
sections reviewed sections reviewed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline, omitted
High-powered 0.434* 0.400*** 1.225*** 0.794***
(0.23) (0.14) (0.42) (0.25)
Origination bonus 0.083 0.005 -0.147 -0.156
(0.22) (0.14) (0.40) (0.21)
Performance bonus low -0.059 -0.133 0.550 0.131
(0.29) (0.21) (0.38) (0.22)
Performance bonus high -0.000 0.019 0.175 -0.084
(0.32) (0.24) (0.32) (0.16)
Loan ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes No Yes
Loan oﬃcer ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes No Yes
Loan oﬃcer controls Yes No Yes No
Number of observations 14,405 14,675 8,520 8,688
R-squared, adjusted 0.232 0.689 0.271 0.725
51Table VI: The Eﬀect of Incentives on Risk-Assessment
This table reports the eﬀect of performance pay on loan oﬃcers’ subjective assessment of credit
risk. Each column shows results from a separate regression. The omitted treatment category
is the low-powered baseline incentive. The dependent variable in regressions (1) and (2) is the
overall risk rating, standardized to have mean zero. The dependent variable in Columns (3) and
(4) is the normalized sub-rating for all categories that pertain to the personal risk of a potential
applicant. In Columns (5) and (6) the dependent variable is the normalized sub-rating for all
rating categories that pertain to the business, management and ﬁnancial risk of a loan applicant.
All regressions include a lab ﬁxed eﬀect, randomization stratum and week ﬁxed eﬀects, as well
as dummies to control for treatment conditions not reported in this table. Loan oﬃcer controls
include age, seniority, rank, education, and indicators for branch manager and business experience.
Standard errors are clustered at the loan oﬃcer × session level. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
Internal rating
Overall rating Personal and Business and
management risk ﬁnancial risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline, omitted
High-powered 0.029 0.006 0.011 -0.001 0.054 0.02
(0.09) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04)
Origination bonus 0.144* 0.006 0.130* -0.015 0.156** 0.021
(0.08) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04)
Loan ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Loan oﬃcer ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Loan oﬃcer controls Yes No Yes No Yes No
Number of observations 14,405 14,675 14,405 14,675 14,405 14,675
R-squared, adjusted 0.151 0.640 0.142 0.644 0.161 0.626
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59A Data Appendix
Table OA.I: Description of Variables
Variable Description
Number of loan ﬁle sections
reviewed
Number of loan ﬁle sections reviewed out of a total of 10 sections: borrower proﬁle,
application form, documentation list, deviations from ﬁnancial ratios, income state-
ment balance sheet, site visit report (residence), site visit report (business), trade
reference check and credit bureau report, if available.
Amount spent on information Number of Rupees spent (from a maximum of 18) per evaluated loan ﬁle. Only deﬁned
when loan oﬃcers were charged for non-basic loan ﬁle sections.
Internal rating Internal rating assigned to loan l by loan oﬃcer i. This measure is normalized by
subtracting the mean of the “control group,” and dividing by the standard deviation
of the “control group.” The control group is deﬁned as those receiving low-powered
incentives [20,0,10]
Personal and management risk Sum of all sub-components of the internal rating pertaining to the applicant’s personal
and management risk, normalized as described above.
Business and ﬁnancial risk Sum of all sub-components of the internal rating pertaining to the applicant’s business
and ﬁnancial risk, normalized as described above.
Overall rating (baseline mean) Mean of all risk ratings assigned to loan l in all evaluations under the “Baseline”
treatment.
Personal and management risk
(baseline mean)
Mean of all risk ratings capturing personal and management risk, assigned to loan l
in all evaluations under the “Baseline” treatment.
Business and ﬁnancial risk
(baseline mean)
Mean of all risk ratings capturing business and ﬁnancial risk, assigned to loan l in all
evaluations under the “Baseline” treatment.
Approved Dummy equal to 1 if a loan evaluated in the experiment was approved.
Proﬁt per approved loan Proﬁt per approved loan from the viewpoint of the lender, measured as the discounted
stream of payments and origination fee minus the initial disbursement amount. Loans
turned down in the experiment are excluded.
Proﬁt per screened loan Proﬁt per approved loan from the viewpoint of the lender, measured as the discounted
stream of payments and origination fee minus the initial disbursement amount. For
loans turned down in the experiment, the proﬁt is equal to 0.
60B Appendix Tables
Table OA.I: Test of Random Assignment
This table presents a test of random assignment across the four main treatments. We regress treatment
dummies on demographic variables, controlling for randomization strata, lab and week ﬁxed eﬀects. Age
is the loan oﬃcer’s age in years, Male is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the participant is male.
Rank is the loan oﬃcer’s level of seniority in the bank. Experience is the number of years the loan oﬃcer
has been employed by the bank. Branch Manager is a dummy variable indicating whether the participant
has ever served as a branch manager. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
Incentive Treatment
High-powered Origination bonus
(1) (2)
Male 0.006 -0.017
(0.03) (0.03)
Age -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Education [Master’s degree] -0.031 0.014
(0.019) (0.020)
Experience [Years] 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Rank [1 Lowest - 5 Highest] -0.005 -0.009
(0.008) (0.008)
Branch manager experience -0.007 -0.012
(0.023) (0.024)
Number of observations 9,268 9,806
R-squared, adjusted 0.314 0.322
61Table OA.II: Test for Learning During the Experiment
This table presents a formal test for the presence of learning eﬀects during the
experiment. The dependent variable in column (1) is a dummy variable taking on
a value of one for a correct lending decision, deﬁned as approving a performing
loan or declining a non-performing loan. The dependent variable in column (2)
is the proﬁt per loan for the sample of approved loans, denominated in US$ ’000,
The dependent variable in column (3) is the proﬁt per loans for the total sample
of screened loans in units of US$ ’000. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
Lending decisions Proﬁt per loan
correct approved screened
(1) (2) (3)
Number of experimental -0.002* 0.003 -0.003
sessions completed (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Loan ﬁxed eﬀects Yes No No
Loan oﬃcer ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 14,675 9,357 13,084
R-squared 0.322 0.652 0.415
62Table OA.III: Predictive Content of Internal Ratings
This table presents evidence on the predictive content of internal ratings. The dependent variable in
column (1) is a dummy equal to 1 if a loan was approved by the reviewing loan oﬃcer and 0 otherwise.
The dependent variable in column (2) is a dummy equal to 1 if a loan performed and 0 otherwise.
In column (3) the dependent variable is the proﬁt per loan of approved loans, denominated in units
of US$ ’000. The dependent variable in column (4) is the proﬁt per screened loan, denominated in
units of US$ ’000. Each regression includes controls for the incentive treatment conditions and the
number of experimental sessions completed by the reviewing loan oﬃcer. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 ***
p<0.01.
Lending Performance Proﬁt per loan
Approved=1 Performing=1 approved screened
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Final Rating
Log internal rating 1.348*** 0.322*** 0.659*** 0.305***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.19) (0.05)
Number of observations 13,979 13,979 8,834 12,411
R-squared 0.443 0.064 0.03 0.024
Panel B: Personal and Management Risk
Log internal rating 1.159*** 0.279*** 0.476*** 0.251***
Personal and management risk (0.04) (0.03) (0.17) (0.06)
Number of observations 13979 13979 8834 12,411
R-squared 0.368 0.061 0.03 0.023
Panel C: Business and Financial Risk
Log internal rating 1.265*** 0.318*** 0.572*** 0.282***
Business and ﬁnancial risk (0.04) (0.02) (0.18) (0.05)
Number of observations 13,979 13,979 8,834 12,411
R-squared 0.439 0.066 0.03 0.024
Loan ﬁxed eﬀects No No No No
Loan oﬃcer ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
63Table OA.IV: The Eﬀect of Incentives on Eﬀort
This table reports treatment eﬀects of performance pay on screening eﬀort. Each column reports results
from a separate regression. The omitted treatment category is the low-powered baseline incentive. The
dependent variable in column (1) and (2) is number of sections of the loan ﬁle viewed; the dependent
variable in Columns (3) and (4) is the number of loan ﬁle sections reviewed when loan oﬃcers were
required to pay for additional information. The regressions in Columns (1) and (2) include the entire
sample, while Columns (3) and (4) limit the data to evaluations to the “costly information setting.”
All regressions include a lab ﬁxed eﬀect, randomization stratum and week ﬁxed eﬀects, as well as
dummies to control for treatment conditions not reported in this table. Loan oﬃcer controls include
age, seniority, rank, education, and indicators for branch manager and business experience. Standard
errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the loan oﬃcer × session level. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
Free information Costly information
Loan ﬁle Loan ﬁle
sections reviewed sections reviewed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline, omitted
High-powered 0.488* 0.332** 1.225*** 0.794***
(0.28) (0.15) (0.42) (0.25)
Origination bonus 0.125 -0.135 -0.147 -0.156
(0.28) (0.16) (0.40) (0.21)
Performance bonus low -0.054 -0.101 0.550 0.131
(0.29) (0.21) (0.38) (0.22)
Performance bonus high -0.018 0.080 0.175 -0.084
(0.32) (0.25) (0.32) (0.16)
Loan ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes No Yes
Loan oﬃcer ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes No Yes
Loan oﬃcer controls Yes No Yes No
Number of observations 5,885 5,987 8,520 8,688
R-squared, adjusted 0.232 0.689 0.271 0.725
64Table OA.V: The Eﬀect of Incentives on Risk-Assessment
This table reports the eﬀect of performance pay on loan oﬃcers’ subjective assessment of credit
risk. Each column shows results from a separate regression. The omitted treatment category
is the low-powered baseline incentive. The dependent variable in regressions (1) and (2) is the
overall risk rating, standardized to have mean zero. The dependent variable in Columns (3) and
(4) is the normalized sub-rating for all categories that pertain to the personal risk of a potential
applicant. In Columns (5) and (6) the dependent variable is the normalized sub-rating for all
rating categories that pertain to the business, management and ﬁnancial risk of a loan applicant.
All regressions include a lab ﬁxed eﬀect, randomization stratum and week ﬁxed eﬀects, as well
as dummies to control for treatment conditions not reported in this table. Loan oﬃcer controls
include age, seniority, rank, education, and indicators for branch manager and business experience.
Standard errors are clustered at the loan oﬃcer × session level. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
Internal risk-rating
Overall rating Personal and Business and
management risk ﬁnancial risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline, omitted
High-powered 0.029 0.006 0.011 -0.001 0.054 0.02
(0.09) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04)
Origination bonus 0.144* 0.006 0.130* -0.015 0.156** 0.021
(0.08) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04)
Performance bonus low 0.044 0.157*** 0.024 0.141** 0.055 0.142**
(0.11) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06)
Performance bonus high 0.267** 0.298*** 0.247** 0.285*** 0.266** 0.275***
(0.12) (0.06) (0.12) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06)
Loan ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Loan oﬃcer ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Loan oﬃcer controls Yes No Yes No Yes No
Number of observations 14,405 14,675 14,405 14,675 14,405 14,675
R-squared, adjusted 0.151 0.64 0.142 0.644 0.161 0.626
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